The aim of Intelligence is to predict possible and really useful scenarios for decision makers. These operators must be in a position to support their own actions with the best available knowledge, whatever the articulation of a structure at their disposal may be. In order to do this , the analyst has to be aware of the operative limits present in any component of the intelligence cycle. It is not only a question of the usability of data, sources, tools and depth allowed in the research field but of the objectivity of the analysis as well. Biases, like viruses, may affect every strategic level in the activity of Intelligence, from technical to ‘grand-strategical’: they serve a ‘particular’ competitive advantage, they are present inside and outside the environment where the analysis is formed and they nature is intentional and accidental. Intoxication of information is a systemic component in the forming of opinions by now: highlighting effects and not erasing it has to be an integral part of the final outcome.